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Abstract. We consider binary voting systems in which a probability dis-
tribution over coalitions is known. In this broader context decisiveness is
an extension of the Penrose-Banzhaf index and success an extension of
the Rae index for simple games. Although decisiveness and success are
conceptually dierent we analyze their numerical behavior. The main
result provides necessary and sucient conditions for the ordinal equiv-
alence of them. Indeed, under anonymous probability distributions they
become ordinally equivalent. Moreover, it is proved that for these dis-
tributions, decisiveness and success respect the strength of the seats,
whereas luckiness reverses the order.
1 Introduction
In the classical model of voting simple games, modeled by (N;W ), some `power
indices' have been introduced with the purpose of measuring the decisiveness
of a player in the game. Shapley and Shubik's [21] interpretation of their index
as the probability of being `pivotal' in the making of a decision contributed
to the association between `power' and `measure of decisiveness'. Penrose's [19],
Banzhaf's [1] and Coleman's [5] indices are also evaluations of decisiveness. Since
then many papers analyze interesting aspects of decisiveness (see e.g., Felsenthal
and Machover [8] and [9], Turnovec et al. [23], Turnovec [22]).
An alternative view is the notion of satisfaction or success. That is, focusing
in the likelihood of obtaining the result one votes for irrespective of whether
one's vote is crucial for it or not. Rae [20] was the rst to take an interest in
a measure of success for symmetric simple games, or k-out-of-n games. Dubey
and Shapley [7] suggest that the index can be generalized to any simple game
and for any voter, leading to what can be referred to as the Rae index.
However, for any simple game there is an ane relationship between the
Banzhaf index and the Rae index so that the two notions become quite similar.
Additionally to the given simple game (N;W ), in this work we consider that
a probability distribution over voters is known and that this probability distri-
bution is independent. That is, we assume that we know { or at least have an
estimate of { the probability of the voting intention for each voter that may arise.
This information is captured in a vector p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) 2 (0; 1)n where pi
indicates the propensity to vote armatively for the proposed collective pro-
posal. Although extreme estimations for pi (either pi = 1 or pi = 0) are possible,
we discard them since an innitesimal error margin in the prediction seems more
realistic. Clearly, if vector p is known then the probability of occurrence for each
coalition is known. Thus, the model considered in this situation is represented
by the triple (N;W;p).
In this broader context Laruelle and Valenciano [15] (see also [16]) prove
that success and decisiveness are related linearly for all game if and only if the
(independent) probability distribution is anonymous and with equal inclination
towards yes and no. Although success and decisiveness are conceptually dier-
ent the main purpose of this work is to study when these notions have a similar
behavior. A comparative study for independent and anonymous probability dis-
tributions for success and decisiveness is done in [11] for proper symmetric voting
rules. It is proved that for success the higher the level of consensus required the
lower the success of voters. Contrarily, decisiveness behaves dierently when the
common probability of acceptance is close to 1. Consequently, the dierent rank-
ings between success and decisiveness depend on the behavior of decisiveness.
Other measures in the literature focus in dierent aspects to those of success
and decisiveness: luck (which is also studied in this paper, see e.g. Holler and
Packel [12] for a discussion), satisfaction (see e.g. Davis et al. [6] and [4]), or
inclusiveness (see, Konig and Brauninger [13]).
The paper is organized as follows. In the remaining of this section we recall
the main necessary denitions to follow the work. In Section 2 we introduce a
Boolean treatment for simple games which admits a clear probabilistic inter-
pretation and facilitates the further developments, we also incorporate a new
simpler proof of an essential known result. Anonymous probability distributions
are treated in Section 3 where we prove that success and decisiveness are or-
dinally equivalent if and only if the probability distribution is anonymous. For
these distributions we also prove that luckiness shows an opposite order than suc-
cess and decisiveness. Thus, while success and decisiveness respect the strength
of the seats in the voting system, luckiness reverses the order.
1.1 The basic model (N;W )
The usual model for a voting scenario like the one described is a simple game,
that is to say, a pair (N;W ), where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng denotes the set of voters,
and W is the set of winning coalitions, i.e., sets of voters whose favorable vote
ensures the acceptation of the proposal. Subsets of N that are not in W are
called losing coalitions, and it is assumed that:
1) ; is losing,
2) subsets of losing coalitions are again losing (monotonicity),
3) N is a winning coalition.
A winning coalition is minimal if each proper subset is a losing coalition.
The set of minimal winning coalitions is usually denoted by Wm, and, because
of monotonicity, it completely determines the game. A voter i is null if i =2 S for
all S 2 Wm, i.e., it has no inuence in the game. A simple game without null
voters is called a robust simple game.
A useful tool for comparing the inuence of two voters in a voting system is
the desirability relation. Voter i is at least as desirable as voter j (written i % j)
in (N;W ) if
S [ fjg 2W implies S [ fig 2W for all S  N n fi; jg;
if moreover T[fjg =2W but T[fig 2W for some T  N nfi; jg it is said that i is
more desirable than j as a coalitional partner (and then write i  j). Of course,
voters i and j are equally desirable (and write i  j) when i % j and j % i. A
game is called complete if i % j or j % i for all i; j 2 N . Complete games give a
total ranking of importance of the seats of voters and we will assume hereafter
that in a complete game we have
1 % 2 %    % n:
Weighted games are examples of complete games. In a weighted game each
player is a assigned a weight and the weight of a coalition is just the sum of
the weights of the individuals that form it, and some preset quota is needed for
passage. The winning coalitions are those whose weight equals or surpasses the
preset quota. An arbitrary weighted representation is denoted
[q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn]
where wi is the weight of voter i and q is the quota.
A symmetric rule or k-out-of-n-rule is a game with n voters in which all
minimal winning coalitions have size k. All players are therefore equally desirable
and the game admits a weighted representation with quota k and weight 1 for
all voters.
Loosely speaking, a power index is a function g which assigns to a simple
game (N;W ) a vector g(N;W ) 2 Rn where each component gi(N;W ) is a
measure for the ith voter in the simple game (N;W ) according to g. As the game
under analysis, (N;W ), will always be clearly specied, we will write g instead
of g(N;W ) hereafter. Although there are several power indices well recognized
in this work we concentrate our attention in the Banzhaf index [1] (already
anticipated by Penrose [19]) and the Rae index [20] since they are the most
natural representatives of decisiveness and success respectively. Two forms of
measuring power under dierent perspectives.
The `raw' Banzhaf index for a voter i in (N;W ) is given by the number of
times in which i is decisive in winning coalitions, i.e., i 2 S 2W and Snfig =2W .
Dubey and Shapley [7] (see also Owen [18]) proposed the following normalization
of the `raw' Banzhaf index as the ratio:
Bzi =
number of winning coalitions in which i is decisive
2n 1
(1)
where the denominator counts the number of coalitions containing i. Expres-
sion (1) is equivalent to
Bzi =
number of coalitions in which i is decisive
2n
(2)
in which i is decisive in a coalition S if either i 2 S 2 W and S n fig =2 W or
i =2 S =2W and (S [ fig) 2W .
The Rae index for a voter i in (N;W ) is given by the proportion of coalitions
in which the state (either winning or losing) of the coalition coincides with the
vote of the voter.
Raei =
jfS : i 2 S 2Wgj+ jfS : i =2 S =2Wgj
2n
(3)
The relation between these two indices is given by
Raei = 0:5 + 0:5Bzi (4)
1.2 The extended model (N;W; p)
Let PN denote the set of all distributions of probabilities over 2
N in which each
voter i independently votes `yes' with probability pi and `no' with probability
1  pi. The probability of coalition S to be formed is then given by
P (S) =
Y
i2S
pi
Y
i2NnS
(1  pi) (5)
Thus, an element of PN is determined by p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) and the probability
of acceptance of the submitted proposal is given byX
S:S2W
P (S) =
X
S:S2W
Y
i2S
pi
Y
i2NnS
(1  pi)
Let's consider now the natural extensions of the Banzhaf and Rae indices in
the more general context (N;W;p).
Denition 1. Let (N;W;p) be a simple game with probability distribution p 2
PN over coalitions, and let i 2 N :
i) Voter i's success is the probability that i is successful:

i(p) = P (i is successful) =
X
S:i2S2W
P (S) +
X
S:i=2S=2W
P (S) (6)
ii) Voter i's decisiveness is the probability that i is decisive:
i(p) = P (i is decisive) =
X
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n i =2 W
P (S) +
X
S : i =2 S =2 W
S [ i 2 W
P (S) (7)
Decisiveness only depends on the other voters' behaviour, not his/her own, since
voter i's decisiveness can be written as
i(p) =
X
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n i =2 W
(P (S) + P (S n fig)):
and, for each S, P (S) + P (S n fig) is the probability of all voters in S n fig
voting `yes' and those in N n S voting `no'. Since voter i's success depends on
all voters' behavior and voter i's decisiveness depends only on the other voters'
behavior, there is no way to derive one of these notions from the other, and the
only relations in general are the obvious:
i(p)  
i(p);
and Barry's ( [2] and [3]) equation: `Success' = `Decisiveness'+ `Luck', which
remains valid in this more general context:

i(p) = i(p) + i(p); (8)
wherein i(p) denotes voter i's `luck' or probability of being `lucky', that is:
i(p) =
X
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n i 2 W
P (S) +
X
S : i =2 S =2 W
S [ i =2 W
P (S)
2 Another view of the two models
For the sake of getting a more ecient description in the developments and proofs
of the work we consider a Boolean context which turns out to be equivalent to
the classical model presented.
2.1 The basic model (N;)
Assume that both the game and the actions of voters are binary, that is, the
voters can only be in one of two possible states: voting `yes' or voting `no' for
the issue at hand, and, after the vote has concluded, the result of the game is
either to `pass' the proposal or to `defeat' it. Let the binary variable xi indicate
the action of voter i for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
xi =

1 if voter i votes `yes'
0 if voter i votes `no'.
Then, vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) represents the states of all voters and is in one-
to-one correspondence with the coalition S = fi 2 N : xi = 1g. Let  represent
the state of the game, and
 =

1 if the proposal is accepted
0 if the the proposal is rejected.
That is, the state of the game is a deterministic function of the states of voters.
Thus, it can be written as
 = (x) =
X
S:S2W
Y
i2S
xi
Y
i2NnS
(1  xi) (9)
where (x) is called the multilinear extension of the game (Owen [17]). Each
game (N;W ) is completely determined by a unique multilinear extension (N;)
in which:
1) (0) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0) = 0,
2)  is a non-decreasing function in each variable xi, and
3) (1) = (1; 1; : : : ; 1) = 1.
As  and W are in one-to-one correspondence, we will indistinctively use
from now on the simple game given by (N;) or its multilinear extension.
Example 1 (k-out-of-n rule or symmetric voting rule). A proposal is passed in
a k-out-of-n game if and only if at least k of the n voters vote armatively. The
symmetric voting rule is given by
(x) = 1 if and only if
nX
i=1
xi  k:
Note that for n odd and k = (n+1)=2, it is the simple majority rule, while when
k = n, it is the unanimity rule which can also be expressed as
(x) =
nY
i=1
xi = minfx1; x2; : : : ; xng:
For any i = 1; 2; : : : ; n the following equation, which may easily be deduced
from (9), can be used for the multilinear function:
(x) = xi(1i;x) + (1  xi)(0i;x) (10)
where (i;x) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xi 1; ; xi+1; : : : ; xn).
Let's going to describe the Banzhaf and the Rae indices by using . Let
mi =
X
(1i;x)
[(1i;x)  (0i;x)]
where the summand over (1i;x) covers the set of all coalitions that contain voter
i andmi counts the number of winning coalitions which contain i and are decisive
for it, and
m0i =
X
(0i;x)
[(1i;x)  (0i;x)]
where the summand over (0i;x) covers the set of all coalitions that does not
contain voter i and m0i counts the number of losing coalitions which do not
contain i and are decisive for it. It is clear that
mi = m
0
i:
Therefore, both mi and m
0
i coincide with the raw Banzhaf index (i.e., the nu-
merator in (1)) which can be written in this context as
Bzi =
mi
2n 1
which is obviously equivalent to
Bzi =
2mi
2n
=
mi +m
0
i
2n
=
total decisiveness for i
total number of coalitions
which coincides with the formula in (2).
The raw Rae index (numerator in (3)) corresponds to
jf(1i;x) : (1i;x) = 1gj+ jf(0i;x) : (0i;x) = 0gj
which after normalization by the total number of coalitions 2n converts into the
Rae index.
Raei =
jf(1i;x) : (1i;x) = 1gj+ jf(0i;x) : (0i;x) = 0gj
2n
2.2 The extended model (N;; p)
Let's consider a particular vote. Let Xi be a binary random variable, and
Xi =

1 if voter i votes `yes'
0 if voter i votes `no';
with PfXi = 1g = pi = E(Xi), for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, where E() denotes the ex-
pected value of the random variable and pi is the expected probability that voter
i votes armatively according to some external observer and at a given time be-
fore the vote takes place. Assume that the random variables Xi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
are mutually statistically independent. Introducing X = (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn) and
p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn), the expectation to pass the proposal submitted to vote in
(N;) is given by
f(p) = P (f(X) = 1g) = E((X))
which is a function of the expected probabilities of the voters.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). The unanimity rule (x) =
nQ
i=1
xi in Exam-
ple 1 has
f(p) =
nY
i=1
pi
as the expected probability to pass the proposal.
If p1 = p2 =    = pn = p the k-out-of-n game, in which (x) = 1 if and only
if
nP
i=1
xi  k has expected probability
f(p) =
nX
i=k

n
i

pi(1  p)n i
to pass the proposal.
Note that f(p) is a multilinear in each pi. Thus, when p1 = p2 =    = pn = p,
f(p) is a polynomial function in p.
Proposition 1. Let f(p) be the expected value to pass the proposal in a simple
game. Then, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
f(p) = pif(1i;p) + (1  pi)f(0i;p) (11)
where (i;p) = (p1; p2; : : : ; pi 1; ; pi+1; : : : ; pn). Moreover, f(p) is strictly in-
creasing in each pi (for 0 < pi < 1) if the simple game is robust and it is
non-decreasing for simple games in general.
Proof. Using decomposition (10) and the independence of voters,
f(p) = E((X)) = E(Xi)E((1i;X)) + (1  E(Xi))(E((0i;X)):
Equation (11) follows immediately. From equation (11),
@f(p)
@pi
= f(1i;p)  f(0i;p) (12)
so that
@f(p)
@pi
= E((1i;X))  E((0i;X))
Because  is nondecreasing, then (1i;x)  (0i;x)  0. In addition, (1i;y) 
(0i;y) = 1 for some y because each voter is non-null in robust simple games.
Since 0 < pi < 1 for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; y has a positive probability of occurring.
Thus, E((1i;X)) E((0i;X)) > 0, and the monotonicity result follows. If the
simple game is not robust, it has at least a null voter, i, for whom E((1i;X)) 
E((0i;X)) = 0, and the second monotonicity result follows.
We may now formulate convenient expressions for decisiveness and success
in denition 1.
Proposition 2 (Decisiveness and success measures in the context (N;;p)).
1. i(p) =
@f(p)
@pi
= f(1i;p)  f(0i;p);
2. 
i(p) = pif(1i;p) + (1  pi)(1  f(0i;p)):
Proof. 1. From equation (7) in denition 1 and equation (5) it follows
i(p) =
P
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n i =2 W
P (S) +
P
S : i =2 S =2 W
S [ i 2 W
P (S)
=
P
S : j 2 S n i; S 2 W
S n i =2 W
(pi + (1  pi))
 Q
j2Sni
pj
Q
j2NnS
(1  pj)
!
=
P
S : j 2 S n i; S 2 W
S n i =2 W
Q
j2Sni
pj
Q
j2NnS
(1  pj)
On the other hand
f(1i;p) =
X
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n i =2 W
Y
j2Sni
pj
Y
j2NnS
(1 pj) +
X
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n i 2 W
Y
j2Sni
pj
Y
j2NnS
(1 pj)
and
f(0i;p) =
X
S : i =2 S;
S 2 W
Y
j2Sni
pj
Y
j2(NnS)ni
(1 pj) =
X
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n i 2 W
Y
j2Sni
pj
Y
j2NnS
(1 pj)
Thus, the second term in f(1i;p) simplies with f(0i;p) in f(1i;p) f(0i;p)
and therefore i(p) coincides with f(1i;p)  f(0i;p).
2. From equation (6) in denition 1 it is clear that success is

i(p) = P (fXi = 1g \ f(X) = 1g) + P (fXi = 0g \ f(X) = 0g)
as we assume independent probability distributions it is clear that the rst
term is pif(1i;p) since pi is a common factor in all the addends of f(1i;p),
while the second term coincides with (1   pi)(1   f(0i;p)) since 1   pi is a
common factor of all addends in 1 f(0i;p) and this latter expression is the
probability that the proposal does not pass with voter i voting against it.
2.3 The special case of anonymous and equally inclined probability
distributions
A probability distribution is anonymous if the probability of a coalition depends
only on the number of `yes'-voters, that is, P (S) = P (R) whenever jSj = jRj.
Hence, an anonymous distribution in PN is given by P (S) = p
s(1   p)n s for
all S  N with s = jSj and p = p = (p; p; : : : ; p).
An anonymous probability distribution with equal inclination towards `yes'
and `no' is given by
p(S) =
1
2n
for all coalitions S  N:
where p = p = (1=2; 1=2; : : : ; 1=2). This is equivalent to assuming that each
voter, independently of the others, votes `yes' with probability 1=2, and votes
`no' with probability 1=2.
As the basic model (N;W ) corresponds to the model (N;W;p) for anony-
mous and equal inclination probability vector p = p it follows from previous
proposition 2 that
i(p
) = Bzi and 
i(p) = Raei:
since
i(p
) = f(1i; p)  f(0i; p); and

i(p
) = 0:5 + 0:5[ f(1i; p)  f(0i; p) ]:
which leads to the well-known ane relationship (4).
The approach followed above of this section 2 allows an easy treatment of
some known but also some new properties. Indeed, the next result was already
proved by Laruelle et al. [14] by using double induction in the proof. We provide
here an alternative shorter proof.
Theorem 1. 
i(p) = 0:5 + 0:5i(p) holds for all game (N;) if and only if
p is anonymous and equally inclined (i.e., p = p).
Proof. The implication from right to left is obvious. For the other implication,
assume that 
i(p) = 0:5 + 0:5i(p) holds for all game. By substituting the
expressions of 
i(p) and i(p) in proposition 2:

i(p) = pif(1i;p) + (1   pi)(1   f(0i;p) and i(p) = f(1i;p)   f(0i;p) it
follows:
(pi   0:5)[f(1i;p) + f(0i;p)  1] = 0:
Thus either pi = 0:5 or f(1i;p) + f(0i;p)  1 = 0 for all game.
But for the unanimity rule1 it holds: f(1i;p) =
Q
j 6=i
pj and f(0i;p) = 0, thus
f(1i;p) + f(0i;p)  1 < 0 and therefore for all i 2 N it must be pi = 0:5.
Thus, for anonymous and equally inclined probability distributions, success
and decisiveness are related in an ane relation but this strong similarity is
exclusive for p.
3 A study for anonymous probability distributions
The formulas stated in the following lemma will be used in this work.
Lemma 1. Let i; j be dierent voters in N . Then,
a) i(p)  j(p) = (pj   pi)[f(1i; 1j ;p) + f(0i; 0j ;p)  f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p)]
+ [f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p)]
b) 
i(p) 
j(p) = 2pi(1  pj)f(1i; 0j ;p)  2pj(1  pi)f(0i; 1j ;p) + pj   pi
Proof. Part a) is obtained by using (11) and (12) in Denition 1-ii). Part a) is
obtained by using proposition 2-2) in Denition 1-i).
Denition 2. Two power indices g and h in the context (N;p) are ordinally
equivalent if they rank voters equally, i.e., for all i; j 2 N :
gi > gj () hi > hj
which implies that gi = gj if and only if hi = hj.
1 Some other rules can also be considered instead.
Of course any power index gives a total ranking for players. We say that the
rankings given by g and h are opposite if they rank voters in an opposite way,
i.e., for all i; j 2 N :
gi > gj () hi < hj
which implies that gi = gj if and only if hi = hj .
As a consequence of the next result we deduce that, if the game has more
than two voters, then success and decisiveness are ordinally equivalent but for
non-anonymous probability distributions these rankings can always be dierent.
Theorem 2. Let i; j be dierent voters in N . Then,
i) If pi = pj then [ 
i(p) > 
j(p) () i(p) > j(p) ] for any game :
ii) If N = fi; jg then [ 
i(p) > 
j(p) () i(p) > j(p) ] for any game :
iii) If pi 6= pj and there is a voter k 6= i; j with pk 6= 1=2; then we can nd
a game  such that [
i(p) 
j(p)] [i(p)  j(p)] < 0:
iv) If pi 6= pj and for any voter k 6= i; j it is pk = 1=2; then we can nd
a game  such that i(p) 6= j(p) and 
i(p) = 
j(p):
Proof. i) If pi = pj = p then from lemma 1 it is
i(p)  j(p) = f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p)

i(p) 
j(p) = 2p(1  p)[f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p)]
for any game . The fact that 0 < p < 1 leads to the conclusion.
ii) If N = fi; jg then there are only four possible games, and we see that in all
of them the statement is true.
 If f(p) = pi it is i = 1 > j = 0 and 
i = 1 > 
j = 1 pi pj+2pipj :
 If f(p) = pj it is i = 0 < j = 1 and 
i = 1 pi pj+2pipj < 
j = 1:
 If f(p) = pipj it is  = (pj ; pi) and 
 = (1  pi + pipj ; 1  pj + pipj):
 If f(p) = pi + pj   pipj it is  = (1   pj ; 1   pi) and 
 = (1   pj +
pipj ; 1  pi + pipj):
iii) Assume, without loss of generality, that pi < pj , and let k 6= i; j be such
that pk 6= 1=2.
 If pk < 1=2 then consider the game  with f(p) = pipk + pjpk   pipjpk.
In this case it is f(1i; 1j ;p) = pk, f(0i; 0j ;p) = 0 and f(1i; 0j ;p) =
f(0i; 1j ;p) = pk. Thus, from Lemma 1,
i(p)  j(p) = (pj   pi)( pk) < 0

i(p) 
j(p) = (pj   pi)( 2pk + 1) > 0
 If pk > 1=2 then consider the game with f(p) = pk + pipj   pipjpk. In
this case it is f(1i; 1j ;p) = 1 and f(0i; 0j ;p) = f(1i; 0j ;p) = f(0i; 1j ;p) =
pk. Thus, from Lemma 1,
i(p)  j(p) = (pj   pi)(1  pk) > 0

i(p) 
j(p) = (pj   pi)(1  2pk) < 0
iv) Taking any k 6= i; j, the game  with f(p) = pk + pipj   pipjpk veries that
i(p)  j(p) = (pj   pi)=2 and 
i(p) 
j(p) = 0
and the statement is proved.
The next Corollary shows that although success and decisiveness are con-
ceptually dierent they rank voters in the same way for anonymous probability
distributions.
Corollary 1. Let n  3. Then,
[i(p) > j(p) , 
i(p) > 
j(p)] for all ; i; j 2 N () p is anonymous:
Proof. From Theorem 2-i) it is clear that if all components of p coincide (p = p)
then i(p) > j(p) if and only if 
i(p) > 
j(p), for any game  and for any
dierent elements i; j in N .
Conversely, if pi 6= pj for some components i; j 2 N then, from Theorem 2-
iii),iv) we can nd a game  for which i(p) > j(p) but 
i(p)  
j(p).
Corollary 1 states that, if the probability distribution is anonymous, i.e.,
coincident for all voters, then success and decisiveness rank them in the same way
independently of the game considered and this only occurs for these probability
distributions. Thus, for anonymous probability distributions both measures are
ordinally equivalent and therefore no matter, from the ordinal point of view,
which measure we take, since both measures give the same ranking. Although
both measures are conceptually dierent and evaluate dierent aspects of power
the rankings they produce are the same.
But for non-anonymous probability distributions we can always get dierent
rankings for the two measures. If one considers, as we do, that the two indices
measure dierent aspects of the game it is then relevant to compute both for
having a good understanding of the problem.
In the next subsection let's investigate a little deeper about the ordinal equiv-
alence between success and decisiveness for anonymous probability distributions.
3.1 The antagonistic behavior of luckiness in front of success and
decisiveness
Corollary 1 showed that success and decisiveness rank voters equally for all
game if the probability distribution is anonymous. However which is the eect
of luckiness? Barry's equation (8) is of course a useful tool to clarify this posed
question.
From lemma 1 and Barry's equation (8) it easily follows the next lemma.
Lemma 2.
i(p) j(p) = 2[pif(1i; 0j ;p)  pjf(0i; 1j ;p)] + (pi  pj)(b  1)  a(1+ 2pipj)
where: a = f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p) and
b = @
2f
@pi@pj
= [f(1i; 1j ;p) + f(0i; 0j ;p)  f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p)].
Note that a and b are functions of the probabilities of voters dierent from i and
j. Thus, they do not depend on pi and pj .
Proposition 3. Let i, j be dierent voters in N . If pi = pj then
i(p) > j(p) () i(p) < j(p) () 
i(p) < 
j(p):
Proof. Because of corollary 1 we only need to prove the rst equivalence. As
pi = pj , then by lemma 1: i(p) j(p) = a and by lemma 2: i(p) j(p) =
a  ( 2p2 + 2p  1) where p = pi = pj . But  2p2 + 2p  1 < 0 for all p 2 (0; 1),
which concludes the proof.
Next corollary follows from proposition 3.
Corollary 2. For anonymous probability distributions (p = p = (p; : : : ; p))
i(p) > j(p) () i(p) < j(p) () 
i(p) < 
j(p):
That is, the ranks given by luckiness and decisiveness (or luckiness and suc-
cess) are opposite under anonymous probability distributions. Hence, concerning
rankings and for anonymous probability distributions, the opposite eect that
luckiness show compared with decisiveness has no additive eect on success,
since it does not alter the ranking given by decisiveness, that is:
 if 
i(p) 
j(p) > 0 then i(p)  j(p)  
i(p) 
j(p).
 if 
i(p) 
j(p) < 0 then i(p)  j(p)  
i(p) 
j(p).
In summary, for anonymous probability distributions the net eect of lucki-
ness over success is negligible (at least from the ordinal point of view) when it
is compared with decisiveness.
3.2 The importance of the seats in a voting rule
When the probability distribution is anonymous, it seems intuitive that those
voters that occupy a stronger seat should be more powerful for dierent reason-
able power measures. A tool to compare the strength of the seats of two voters
is the desirability relation. Freixas and Pons prove in [10] the following.
Lemma 3. Let (N;;p), i; j 2 N . Then
1. i % j , f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p)  0 for all p.
2. i  j , f(1i; 0j ;p)  f(0i; 1j ;p) > 0 for all p.
Thus from lemmas 1, 2, 3 it follows the next corollary.
Corollary 3.
1. If i % j and pi = pj, then i(p)  j(p),
2. If i  j and pi = pj, then i(p) > j(p),
3. If i % j and pi = pj, then 
i(p)  
j(p),
4. If i  j and pi = pj, then 
i(p) > 
j(p),
5. If i % j and pi = pj, then i(p)  j(p),
6. If i  j and pi = pj, then i(p) < j(p).
Thus, for anonymous probability distributions the strategic part of the model
(N;;p), which is captured by vector p = p = (p; : : : ; p), is neutral since all
players have a common probability. Thus what really matters is then the strength
of the seats for players. Decisiveness and success are ordinally equivalent to the
desirability relation, while Luck is opposite to it. That is, the less signicant
is the seat of a voter the most lucky the voter is. Next result follows from the
previous corollary.
Corollary 4. In a complete game with ranking 1 % 2 %    % n and with
anonymous probability distribution (N;; p) it holds:
1. 1(p)  2(p)      n(p);
2. 
1(p)  
2(p)      
n(p);
3. 1(p)  2(p)      n(p):
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